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The methodology is ready for use, currently as Revision 6. It will receive updates as feedback is received on implementation, and as the field of knowledge in non-proliferation and physical protection evolves.

A fast reactor operates in a more energetic neutron spectrum, and is able, via nuclear transformations within the fuel, to "breed" fissile plutonium (Pu-239) from fertile uranium (U-238), which can then be recycled in fresh fuel. In this way, the energetic potential of U-238, representing more than 99% of the original natural uranium, can also be exploited.

Gen IV fast reactor designs will rep... more

The PR&PP methodology was developed to address one of the four goals identified for future nuclear energy systems in the 2002 Generation IV Roadmap (i.e., next-generation power reactor designs that will see commercial deployment beyond 2030): “Generation IV nuclear energy systems will increase the assurance that they are a very unattractive (i.e., present significant barriers) and the least desi... more

The range of users of the methodology includes designers, program policy makers, national regulators, international agencies, and other stakeholders.

The PR&PP Evaluation Methodology report is available online. The journal Nuclear Technology provides several articles discussing the methodology and providing examples of its application, in Vol. 179, pgs. 1-96, July, 2012.

It will take at least two or three decades before the deployment of commercial Gen IV systems. In the meantime, a number of prototypes will need to be built and operated. The Gen IV concepts currently under investigation are not all on the same timeline and some might not even reach the stage of commercial exploitation.

Examples of advanced reactor prototypes (steps towards Gen IV designs) cu... more

The time requirement can be as little as a few weeks of work for a scoping study that evaluates the system response a small number of representative PR or PP challenges, to a year or more of work to evaluate response to a comprehensive spectrum of challenges.

In 50 years of nuclear energy development and deployment, the safety performance of nuclear power plants has been continuously improved. Some of these improvements are due to adaptation to state-of-the-art, as occurs with all technologies. Others are the result of lessons learnt following incidents and accidents that have occurred (Three Mile Island 1979; Chernobyl, 1986; Fukushima, 2011) and of... more

PR&PP incorporates International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards as external components (sometimes referred to as “extrinsic measures”) of the nuclear energy system being assessed. PR&PP can be used by designers at an early stage to assess where and how one might implement safeguards, in order to guide conceptual design decisions. Safeguards is one feature of a good design that enables th... more

The PR&PP methodology is a systematic and comprehensive tool for assessing and optimizing, at all stages of design, the level of proliferation resistance and physical protection of a nuclear energy system, or components thereof. It is a “pathways evaluation” approach which can account for a full range of hypothetical proliferation or terrorism scenarios (including diversion, misuse, clandestine ... more

The level of effort depends on the stage of design, the range of challenges evaluated, and the needs of the user performing the evaluation. The methodology is adaptable to differing needs. It can involve a single PR&PP expert with subject matter expert support from design staff (for a scoping study), or a team, requiring a few staff-months to a few staff-years.

The results take the form of tables of quantitative or qualitative measures indicating material being obtained, difficulty of obtaining the material and likelihood of detection. These results can be presented in various graphical or tabular forms, depending upon the needs of the individual user and the audience they will be presenting to.

Familiarity with the PR&PP methodology, the system design, and the general requirements of non-proliferation (e.g. international safeguards) and physical protection. Note that this combined expertise need not reside in a single evaluator, but can be represented by an assessment team.