FAQ - Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection
The Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP) evaluation approach, developed by the GIF PRPP Working Group, is a systematic methodology designed to assess and optimize the security and proliferation resistance of nuclear energy systems at all design stages. This FAQ page addresses key aspects of PR&PP, including its development, application, and the expertise required to perform evaluations. You'll find information on the level of effort and time needed for an evaluation, how PR&PP relates to IAEA safeguards and other methodologies, and the benefits of early analysis in the design process.
The Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP) evaluation methodology is an essential tool for support the security and proliferation resistance of nuclear energy systems throughout their design and development. This comprehensive FAQ page provides detailed insights into the PR&PP approach, explaining its purpose, the level of effort and expertise required, and the potential benefits of early implementation in the design process. The page also explores the differences between PR&PP and other evaluation methodologies, such as the IAEA's INPRO, and clarifies the relationship between PR&PP evaluations and IAEA safeguards. This resource is designed to guide designers, policymakers, and regulators in making informed decisions that enhance the security and reliability of nuclear energy systems.
The FAQ covers the following questions:
- What is the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP) evaluation approach?
- Why was the PR&PP methodology developed?
- What is the level of effort needed to perform a PR&PP evaluation?
- What is the time needed to perform a PR&PP evaluation?
- What is the form of the results?
- Who would use the results?
- What is the expertise needed to perform an evaluation?
- What is the purpose of the PR&PP white papers on the six Gen-IV systems?
- How is PR&PP taken into account with small modular reactors?
- How does a PR&PP evaluation differ from an IAEA INPRO evaluation of proliferation resistance?
- What is the relation between PR&PP and IAEA safeguards?
- Does PR&PP apply to national or sub-national actors?
- How does a PR&PP evaluation relate to a safety and reliability evaluation?
- At what stage of an evaluation should a PR&PP evaluation be performed?
- To what type of systems does a PR&PP evaluation apply?
- Are there other methodologies for performing similar evaluations?
- Will the PR&PP methodology be updated or is it in final form?
- What are benefits to performing PR&PP analysis early in the design process?
- Where can I find more information?
The PR&PP methodology is a systematic and comprehensive tool for assessing and optimizing, at all stages of design, the level of proliferation resistance and physical protection of a nuclear energy system, or components thereof. It is a "pathways evaluation" approach which can account for a full range of hypothetical proliferation or terrorism scenarios (including diversion, misuse, clandestine operation, sabotage, and theft), and compute their impact against a set of high level measures.
The PR&PP methodology was developed to address one of the four goals identified for future nuclear energy systems in the 2002 Generation IV Roadmap (i.e., next-generation power reactor designs that will see commercial deployment beyond 2030): "Generation IV nuclear energy systems will increase the assurance that they are a very unattractive (i.e., present significant barriers) and the least desirable route for diversion (i.e., removal by a State from a declared safeguarded facility, or used to produce undeclared nuclear material) or theft of weapons-usable materials, and provide increased physical protection against acts of terrorism."
The level of effort depends on the stage of design, the range of challenges evaluated, and the needs of the user performing the evaluation. The methodology is adaptable to differing needs. It can involve a single PR&PP expert with subject matter expert support from design staff (for a scoping study), or a team, requiring a few staff-months to a few staff-years.
The time requirement can be as little as a few weeks of work for a scoping study that evaluates the system response a small number of representative PR or PP challenges, to a year or more of work to evaluate response to a comprehensive spectrum of challenges.
The results take the form of tables of quantitative or qualitative measures indicating material being obtained, difficulty of obtaining the material and likelihood of detection. These results can be presented in various graphical or tabular forms, depending upon the needs of the individual user and the audience they will be presenting to.
The range of users of the methodology includes designers, program policy makers, national regulators, international agencies, and other stakeholders.
Familiarity with the PR&PP methodology, the system design, and the general requirements of non-proliferation (e.g. international safeguards) and physical protection. Note that this combined expertise need not reside in a single evaluator, but can be represented by an assessment team.
The white papers are meant to serve as an abridged version of a PR&PP evaluation for each of the six classes of advanced reactors. The white papers discuss design differences within each class and provide guidance on PR&PP aspects of advanced reactor designs to help designers and regulators make decisions to reduce proliferation risk and increase robustness against theft of material or sabotage to the facility.
Read the PR&PP White Papers.
Small modular reactors and microreactors based on the six Gen-IV system designs do have unique traits that should be considered in a PR&PP analysis. The small size, modularity of operations, and advanced safety systems need to be considered when examining PR&PP and designing appropriate safeguards and security systems.
PR&PP is a design tool that evaluates the system response to a spectrum of potential PR&PP challenges (e.g., diversion, clandestine program, break-out scenario and terrorism), and can also be used by customers or policy makers in guiding decisions; INPRO is a best-practices checklist aimed mainly at assisting embarking countries in making decisions. INPRO is a broad assessment, including high-level state policy, while PR&PP is focused on the technology.
[The International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) was established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and has developed a methodology for proliferation resistance evaluation which can be found at http://www.iaea.org/INPRO/about.html]
PR&PP incorporates International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards as external components (sometimes referred to as "extrinsic measures") of the nuclear energy system being assessed. PR&PP can be used by designers at an early stage to assess where and how one might implement safeguards, in order to guide conceptual design decisions. Safeguards is one feature of a good design that enables the detection of proliferation. PR&PP assessment assures that this detection is timely by accounting for technical difficulty, time to achieve success, and material type.
Generally PR applies to national actors, and PP to sub-national actors, although there can be interaction between these two.
There are possible synergies between PP&PP and safety/reliability if assessed early enough in the design process and possible conflicts that may be addressed at this time. Even at the earliest stages of conceptual design it is recommended that, in addition to representative safety challenges, designers perform qualitative assessments of the potential system response to representative PR and PP challenges.
PRPP can be performed at the earliest stages of design, and then revisited periodically and detail added as a design progresses and more detail is known.
PR&PP is designed for the assessment of nuclear energy systems, with no specific technology dependence.The elements of the fuel cycle (i.e., components of the fuel supply, reactor, or spent-fuel management architecture) that are included in the assessment are dependent upon the user's needs.
There are other assessment methodologies (e.g. INPRO). The methods are complementary. INPRO assessments can assure that best practices have been considered, and adopted where appropriate, in system design. PR&PP assessments can assure that the system response to PRPP challenges will be acceptable.
The methodology is ready for use, currently as Revision 6. It will receive updates as feedback is received on implementation, and as the field of knowledge in non-proliferation and physical protection evolves.
Benefits include synergies with safety and economics, reduction of risk for schedule slippage, efficiencies in implementing PR&PP-related system design components, guidance on design decisions with maximum flexibility to early design stage.
The PR&PP Evaluation Methodology report is available online. The journal Nuclear Technology provides several articles discussing the methodology and providing examples of its application, in Vol. 179, pgs. 1-96, July, 2012.